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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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parties,' Molotov one of the leaders of a totalitarian state was to decide
which party in Poland was c democratic and anti-Nazi 5, while
every politician in Poland was denounced as Hitler's collaboratoróthe
most eminent citizens of the country headed the Soviet list.
Since the c Lublin Committee ' chosen as a basis of the future Polish
Government had no legal foundation nothing built on it could have
legal status.    Quod ab initio vitiosum est nullo modo convahcere potest.
There was some attempt made in the Declaration to justify this choice,
by   explaining  that  the   ' Lublin  Committee '  was   not   yet   entirely
representative since it did not contain members from c liberated ' Western
Poland.   Did this mean in principle then that the signatories accepted
the Russian theory regarding this * Committee 5 as being representative
of that part of Poland which the Red Army was now occupying, and
which Moscow permitted to still be considered Poland ?   The attitude
of the leaders of the Atlantic Democracies who continued to recognise
the Polish Government as the legitimate Government and as representative
of the whole of Poland however, gave a denial to any such supposition.
There was no possibility of Moscow, who intended to keep what the
Red Army had occupied, ever being persuaded to agree to a really inde-
pendent Polish Government.   Therefore any c new * Government would
under Soviet control merely be the expression of Russia's policy.
The only ray of hope in the blackness of the Crimea Declaration was
that the United States seemed at last to be entering into the affairs of
Europeóthe Atlantic was now no greater obstacle for modern warfare
than the Mediterranean had been in 1939.    The two Great Wars had
convinced the American ruling class of the folly of isolationism, but this
change of policy actuated by Roosevelt coincided with the partitioning
of a country, which, according to the same Roosevelt had been the
* inspiration' to fighting democracy.   Only six weeks had passed since
Stettin jus j the United States Foreign Secretary, had explained in an
official statement that the United States could not guarantee any specific
frontier in Europe, and yet Roosevelt at the Crimea, together with Stalin
and Churchill, was considering the line the Polish Eastern frontier was
to follow.    Was not this the equivalent to a guarantee regarding this
frontier ?   According to the previous statement of Stettinius, this would
have been incompatible with the American Constitution.    In 1919 at
Versailles, the American delegates had participated in the determination
of the frontiers in Europeóbut all their work was rendered useless
later when the United States Senate refused to accept Wilson's thesis.
It might well be asked what then would be the outcome of this delineation
of one frontier of Poland if the remaining frontiers and those of the other
countries were to await the Peace Conference ?
It cannot be denied that after the Crimean deal, the guarantee of
Britain and the United States which had appeared so precious to the
Polish people in those dark years, now seemed valueless. Resigning